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Questioning Waltz 
Adam Humphreys and Hidemi Suganami 
 
Abstract:  Two little-known academics examine the doctoral thesis of a young theorist, 
Kenneth Waltz.  They conclude that his work is important, despite its ambiguities.  Some 
years later, they catch up with Professor Waltz between classes and explore how his ideas 
have developed. 
 
Terms for the Index: anarchy, causes of war, efficient cause, permissive cause, theory, 
third-image, US foreign policy, Vietnam war 
 
 
Professor Hani Magus and Dr Umesh Harpy are in the midst of a viva.  The candidate is 
Kenneth Waltz.  His work turns out to be one of the most successful doctoral theses in the 
history of IR but the examiners are giving him a hard time.  Some years later, the two 
examiners visit Professor Waltz, now a leading IR theorist, for an interview. 
 
Harpy   So, Mr Waltz, your answers so far have clarified a number of ambiguities we 
found in your thesis.  Still, one key question remains.  On this, I should tell you, Professor 
Magus and I have differing interpretations; so you must tell us which of us has got it right.  
The question is this: what are you saying?  [Professor Magus looks alarmed by his 
colleague’s bluntness.]  Is it (1) that there are three places where we can look for the causes 
of war – man, the state, and the international system – and that they are equally important; or 
(2) that, of the three places, the third one is the most important.  My interpretation is that the 
thesis of your thesis, if I may put it that way, is the latter; you, Mr Waltz, are clearly a ‘third-
image’ man, to use your own terminology.  But Professor Magus thinks that you are arguing 
for (1), or at least that that is what you should be arguing for.  Of course, it occurs to me now 
that you may be arguing something else; for example, that – and call this (3) – which of the 
three locations is the most important varies from one case to another.  So what do you say, 
Mr Waltz?  We really need to know. 
 
Magus  Please don’t feel we are cornering you, Mr Waltz.  We do not demand one 
hundred per cent clarity or consistency; even the best PhD theses I have examined over the 
years had many problems.  We are really trying to find out where the balance lies in this very 
interesting work you have produced; is it, let’s say, more about three different places where 
we may find important causes of war or is it more about the particular importance you find in 
the anarchical structure of the international system? 
 
Waltz  Thank you.  Let me begin by going back to one of your earlier questions and 
stressing again that the choice is not between mono-causal analysis and multi-causal analysis.  
Explaining anything in terms of just one cause – well, that won’t do and I am not advocating 
that at all.  I am a multi-causal man.  The question then is which of the many causes of war 
are the most important.  Maybe there is some ambiguity in the thesis as I have presented it.  
But my thinking goes like this: (1) the three locations are all important but for different 
reasons, (2) we should appreciate the specific reason why each of the three locations is 
important, and (3) the reason why the third one, the anarchical structure of the international 
system, is an important cause of war is not often appreciated in current discussions about the 
causes of war and the conditions of peace. 
 
Harpy  Mr Waltz, do you always think in three steps?  Sorry, that’s meant to be a joke. 
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Magus  Er… yes, I think you are touching on something very important in what 
you’ve just said, Mr Waltz.  So, please expand. 
 
Waltz  Thank you.  I assume that we all want to live in a more peaceful world.  So, 
we discuss the conditions of peace but agree that we must first find the causes of war.  That’s 
sensible, in my view.  But when we search for the causes of war, it is easy to be influenced by 
our preconceptions about what’s wrong about the world, especially when such 
preconceptions suggest that the problems of the world can be remedied.  I am aware of two 
very dominant preconceptions of this kind: Christian pacifism and liberal reformism. 
 
Magus  I see; that’s very interesting.  Please go on. 
 
Waltz  Well, if you are a Christian pacifist, you will say, ‘There won’t be any war if 
you all become like us: pacifists’.  Or, if you are a liberal reformist, you will say, ‘War will 
be fought less frequently if more countries of the world become more liberal – because war is 
after all an anathema to liberal values; it undermines them’.  Under the influence of such 
doctrines, there is a general tendency, I reckon, to suppose that the main causes of war are to 
be found either in the way we individually are or in the way we are governed inside our states.  
I am not at all saying that these are stupid ideas.  But we tend to forget one very crucial fact: 
no world peace can ever be permanent when all the states of the world live under anarchy, 
which is the state of war of all against all.  Indeed, under such a system, there is a constant 
possibility of war – in other words, the system is inclined towards war, which may break out 
anywhere, at any time.  My thinking therefore runs as follows: even though there are 
important causes of war to be found in ‘man’ and ‘the state’, we must pay more attention to 
‘the international system’; people come and go, states come and go, but as long as we live 
under international anarchy, we are stuck in the state of war; although one war might end, 
another will surely start. 
 
Harpy  That’s impressively eloquent. 
 
Magus  Indeed, that clarifies a lot.  And I did in fact notice an important discussion in 
the conclusion of your work.  You don’t always think in three steps but sometimes you 
invoke a dichotomy.  I am thinking here of the distinction you draw between ‘efficient’ and 
‘permissive’ causes of war.   Am I right in thinking that this is very important in constructing 
your position? 
 
Harpy   Sorry, I may have missed that point.  Maybe you’d like to explain that, Mr 
Waltz. 
 
Waltz  Professor Magus, I am very glad that the dichotomy attracted your attention.  
When I began my research and started reading a wide variety of theoretical works on 
international relations and war, I was struck by the fact that there is something common in 
these works: they all think of the world as comprising three layers – man, the states and the 
states-system.  That’s why I classified major theories of the causes of war into three kinds.  
But when, towards the end of my research, I began thinking for myself about the causes of 
war, I realised that there is an important distinction to draw between (1) what explains the 
outbreak of a particular war and (2) what makes perpetual peace an impossible dream and 
makes war a perpetual possibility.  In other words, I thought that many theorists had missed 
an important distinction between what explains the occurrence of a particular war and what 
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explains the recurrence of war.  I intend to pursue this theme further at a later stage.  Anyway, 
what explains the outbreak of a particular war is, to put it simply, ‘acts of states’, which 
basically means things committed, or omitted, by individuals acting in the name of their 
states.  These acts bring about a particular instance of war and they are therefore what I call 
‘efficient causes’ of war.  Being acts performed by individuals representing states, they are 
located at the levels of ‘man’ and ‘the state’.  But what explains the recurrence of war is the 
fact that there is nothing to stop states from fighting one another.  This is what I call the 
‘permissive cause’ of war and it is found in the anarchical structure of the international 
system.  The international anarchy is important because this is the one that permits war to 
happen anywhere, at any time; and this tends to be neglected by many people who reduce 
international phenomena to their particular instances.  But I want to avoid that kind of 
reductionism and go for a structural explanation – bearing in mind, of course, that it’s the acts 
of states, and therefore of statesmen, that force us to fight particular wars. 
 
Magus  Well, as my colleague Dr Harpy said, you are impressively eloquent and, I 
must say, quite persuasive.  There are a few issues, though, I feel you may need to clarify 
further to tighten your argument a bit.  Let me just very tentatively indicate a few as they 
occur to me; they are not questions that you have to answer for now but you may want to 
think about them. 
 
Harpy   Please, Professor Magus: do go ahead. 
 
Magus  Well, you said you are thinking in terms of a dichotomy; but I am wondering 
if you may not be conflating two things in your argument.  I mean, isn’t there a difference 
between what you are calling – er, what was it? – the impossibility of perpetual peace and – 
er – what you were calling the recurrence of war?  It seems to me, though I haven’t yet 
thought this through, that there is a difference between something being merely possible and 
something actually recurring.  And if you are saying that war is always a possibility because 
there is nothing to prevent it, why does this quality of there being ‘nothing to prevent war’, if 
I may put it that way, arise only in the international system and not, say, in human nature?  I 
remain somewhat puzzled but, as I said, these are fairly complex issues … 1 
 
[There is a moment’s silence…] 
 
Harpy   There you are, Mr Waltz; your work has certainly been very thought-
provoking.  Unless you wish to add anything to what you have already given us in your 
answers, or you have any thoughts on what Prof Magus is – er – wondering about, you may 
consider that we have completed our examination. 
 
Waltz  Thank you.  I have nothing to add to what I have said in my response to your 
earlier questions. 
 
Magus  Very well, then; if you could leave the room for a while and wait in the lounge, 
one of us will come and collect you when we have reached a decision.  Well done and see 
you in a while.   
 
                                                 
1 So deeply puzzled was he by these and related issues that Magus spent many years, addressing them.  This is 
explained in Hidemi Suganami, 'Understanding Man, the State and War', International Relations  23.3, 2009, 
pp.372-88. 
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[Waltz exits] 
 
Harpy  So, what would we say?  A clear pass? 
 
Magus  I suppose.  He certainly is eloquent.  Alright; what if we said ‘a clear pass’ for 
now?  But we advise him to consider some of the points I was raising at the end if he wants to 
publish his thesis as a book.  We could write that into our report. 
 
Harpy  Great.   Let’s call him in. 
 
----- 
 
Late 1967.  In Professor Waltz’s office. 
 
Harpy  Professor Waltz, you’ve become widely known for your arguments about the 
stability of the Cold War.  I was struck by your confidence, so soon after the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, in describing the Cold War as stable.  I am even more struck now by your claim that 
we’ll miss it when it’s over…2 
 
Magus  Indeed.  I’m not sure I agree with that! 
 
Harpy   … but I’d like to talk about the extent to which you are now engaged in 
debates about domestic politics and how it influences US foreign policy.  Does this mark a 
change of direction for you?  After all, despite what I recall to be your insistence on multi-
causal analysis, your thesis, later published of course as Man, the State, and War, has very 
much given you a reputation as – er – how did we put it at the time …  
 
Magus  As a ‘third-image’ man. 
 
Harpy   Right, as a third-image man or, as you might put it yourself, a structuralist. 
 
Waltz  Well let me start by emphasizing the importance of your own phrase: multi-
causal analysis.  Because I wouldn’t want anyone to think I’m a structural determinist: I’m 
not.3  In the history of international political thought, the third image has largely been 
neglected.  Rousseau, of course, understood its importance, but because it’s a permissive, 
rather than an efficient cause, its importance is easily underestimated.  And that applies in 
policy circles as much as it does in political philosophy: states that ignore the incentives 
created by the anarchic structure of the international system are liable to get themselves into 
trouble. 
 
Harpy  This seems to lie at the heart of what you’ve been saying recently.  In Foreign 
Policy and Democratic Politics you defend democratic governance and even defend the US 
political system as being particularly well set up for responsible foreign policy, but in your 
recent article ‘The Politics of Peace’ you’re highly critical of US policy, most notably in 
Vietnam, and even suggest that a change of government might be required in order to extract 
the US.  Could you explain your thinking? 
 
                                                 
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Politics of Peace’, International Studies Quarterly, 11.3, Sep 1967, p. 199. 
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Letter to the Editor’, International Organization, 36.3, Summer 1982, p. 680. 
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Waltz  Yes indeed.  The simple point we need to appreciate about the Vietnam war is 
that we can only understand what is at stake by thinking in third-image terms: we need to 
recognize that whatever outcome is reached it is not going to affect the global balance of 
power.  What then, is the US interest in it?  I believe that international politics sets traps for 
the powerful.  When survival is no longer on the line it is easy to forget that the dangers 
remain constant: this is why we need to focus more on the third-image.  Of course, I’ve 
argued that bipolarity is stable, but it is stable only if the superpowers recognize the 
incentives confronting them.  President Johnson, like Wilson and Hoover before him, desire, 
though in different ways, to control the world.  This can’t be done and even if it could it 
would be dangerous.  Can we always be sure that the leaders of strong states will be wise?  
And if they claim to act in defence of justice, how is justice to be objectively defined? 
 
Magus  I share some of your concerns here.  If we live in a pluralist world, how indeed 
is justice to be objectively defined?  But I’d like to understand the logic of what you’re 
saying more fully.  You argue that the anarchic structure of the international system, which is 
what third-image analysis is concerned with, creates incentives for states… 
 
Waltz  … and those incentives are clearest for two states which far overshadow any 
other … 
 
Magus  … Absolutely.  But my point is that despite your insistence about the 
incentives anarchy creates, states, even powerful states, can still act foolishly… 
 
Waltz  Exactly.  That’s the danger we face at the moment.  That’s why I’m concerned 
about the present direction of US policy. 
 
Magus  Well it’s certainly a very suggestive framework for thinking about US policy: 
it is, how should I put it… 
 
Harpy  Heuristically powerful? 
 
Magus  Well it’s certainly thought provoking.  But my question is about the 
relationship between the first and third images.  If anarchy is as powerful as you suggest, 
Professor Waltz, what is the likely consequence of a state, even a state as powerful as the US, 
acting foolishly? 
 
Waltz  Well, it is likely to be punished.  It will suffer the consequences. 
 
Harpy  But who can punish a state as powerful as the US? 
 
Magus  Dr Harpy asks a good question.  And I think the problem is quite a deep one.  
After all, even if the US is not so powerful as to prevent a balancing coalition from being 
formed, the formation of such a balancing coalition would surely require that other states 
respond rationally to the incentives created for them?  But if the US can be foolish – and I am 
right, aren’t I, to read you as suggesting that US policy in Vietnam is foolish? – surely other 
states can be foolish too?  In other words, doesn’t the operation of structural incentives 
depend on – one might say that it is reducible to – the choices of states and statesmen? 
 
Waltz  You’re right to suggest that all three images are in a sense intertwined: as I’ve 
argued previously, they are lenses on a more complex reality.  But I still think it’s helpful to 
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treat the system level on its own merits and to ask what incentives it creates.  One can 
certainly never cater for the actions of a Hitler or the reactions of a Chamberlain.4  But 
luckily we are not just relying on the right man (or even woman) being in the right place at 
the right time.  Given the mutual antagonism between the superpowers, the US cannot risk 
getting it wrong and sensible people recognize that.  It is not just an external pressure but 
enters into how we think and, I hope, will shape who we elect next year.  One of the virtues 
of a bipolar world is that the incentives it creates are so clear.  That, at least, is something to 
be thankful for. 
 
Harpy   That’s very interesting.  Your implicit acknowledgement that we always have 
to work with a partial picture is, I think, very important.  But listening to you now highlights 
to me something I’ve wondered for a while: to what extent is your position at heart an ethical 
one? 
 
Waltz  What do you mean? 
 
Harpy   Well, it seems to me that part of your argument is that it is foolish for the US 
to become entangled in Vietnam because doing so goes against the structural incentives, and I 
think Prof Magus is right to ask where those structural incentives emerge from.  But you also 
seem to suggest that some wars are more acceptable than others and, moreover, that that, too, 
reflects the anarchic structure of the international system.  In other words, we all want to live 
in a more peaceful world, but you recognize that, anarchy being, as you would put it, a 
permissive cause of war, some wars are unavoidable: states have to defend themselves.  But 
that also means that some wars are avoidable: they are wars of choice, perhaps pursued with 
good intentions, but avoidable nonetheless. 
 
Waltz  Absolutely.  That is where anarchy creates a trap.  In the absence of any higher 
authority, who is to say which wars of choice are justified and which are not?  The danger of 
seeking to set the world to rights is that it does more harm than good.  Where national 
interests are not at stake, what is to guide us? 
 
Harpy  Do you wish, then, to give us a theory of the national interest, or perhaps of 
US national interests? 
 
Waltz  No, or at least not yet.  [Waltz glances at his pocket-watch.]  Developing a 
theory is a significant undertaking.  Before embarking on such an enterprise one would need 
to know, for a start, what a theory is and is not.  That would require significant preparatory 
reading in the philosophy of science. 
 
Magus  I’m interested in the philosophy of science myself, though I’ve found it hard to 
get absolutely clear on how all the various positions are distinguished from one another.  But 
let me ask: if what you’re offering us isn’t a theory of US national interests, what is it? 
 
Waltz  Well, at the moment I think of myself as being engaged more in analysing US 
foreign policy than theorising it, though I explored some of what would have to be the 
constituent parts of a theory of foreign policy in my recent book.  But an analysis is not a 
theory: I’m putting theoretical ideas to work to explain the risks of our current course of 
action, not creating a theory. 
                                                 
4 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus, 93.3, Summer 1963, p. 906. 
7 
 
 
Harpy  That sounds like an important and most interesting distinction.  Could you 
explain a little more what a theory can and cannot offer us? 
 
[Waltz looks at his watch again.] 
 
Waltz  Well, I have some ideas, but I’m afraid I’ll have to get back to you on that.  
I’ve very much enjoyed our discussion, but I’m late for a class… 
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